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Received
AcceptedExplaining the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives is one of the major challenges for
evolutionary biology. In this study, we experimentally examined human cooperation in the iterated
Snowdrift game (ISD), which has received little attention so far, and compared it with human cooperation
in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), which has become the paradigm for the evolution of
cooperation. We show that iteration in the ISD leads to consistently higher levels of cooperation than in the
IPD. We further demonstrate that the most successful strategies known for the IPD (generous Tit-for-Tat
and Pavlov) were also successfully used in the ISD. Interestingly, we found that female players cooperated
significantly more often than male players in the IPD but not in the ISD. Moreover, female players in the
IPD applied Tit-for-Tat-like or Pavlovian strategies significantly more often than male players, thereby
achieving significantly higher pay-offs than male players did. These data demonstrate that the willingness
to cooperate does not only depend on the type of the social dilemma, but also on the class of individuals
involved. Altogether, our study shows that the ISD can potentially explain high levels of cooperation
among non-relatives in humans. In addition, the ISD seems to reflect the social dilemma more realistically
than the IPD because individuals obtain immediate direct benefits from the cooperative acts they perform
and costs of cooperation are shared between cooperators.
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The occurrence of cooperation is one of the greatest
challenges for evolutionary biology (Hamilton 1964;
Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 1995; Frank 1998). The
problem is how can a behaviour that is costly to the actor
but benefits other individuals be maintained by natural
selection? Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton
1964) provides a solution to this problem when coopera-
tive acts preferentially occur between relatives (Foster
et al. 2006; Lehmann & Keller 2006). However,
cooperation remains a problem in species such as humans,
where cooperation often occurs between non-relatives
(Fehr & Fischbacher 2003).
The problem of cooperation is easily illustrated in the
famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) where two players have
the opportunity to either cooperate or defect, with
cooperation resulting in a benefit to the opposing player
but entailing a cost to the cooperator. In this situation, an
individual player in a one-shot interaction is always better
off when defecting, independent of what the other player
does (table 1a). The PD reflects a social dilemma because
if everybody defects, the mean group pay-off is lower than
if everybody had cooperated (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981).
However, the PD does not represent the frequent situation
where individuals obtain immediate direct benefits from
the cooperative acts they perform and costs of cooperation
are shared between cooperators. Such a situation isr and address for correspondence: Institute of Evolutionary
University of Edinburgh, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9
(rolf.kuemmerli@ed.ac.uk).
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2965encapsulated in the Snowdrift (SD) game, which derives
its name from the following situation: two drivers are
trapped on either side of a snowdrift and have the options
of staying in the car or removing the snowdrift. Letting the
opponent do all the work is the best option but if the other
player stays in the car it is better to shovel (Sugden 1986).
Hence, in this game, cooperation yields a benefit (b) that is
accessible to both players (i.e. free passage to go home),
whereas the cost (c; i.e. removing the snowdrift) is shared
between cooperators (Doebeli & Hauert 2005; table 1b).
Importantly, the SD is still a social dilemma (Dawes 1980)
because defection is favoured when the other player
cooperates, which occurs at the cost of the overall group
pay-off. Situations similar to the SD are ubiquitous in
human working life. For example, two scientists accom-
plishing a research project would each benefit if the other
invests more time than oneself in the writing of the paper
reporting the collaborative work. But if one of the
collaborators does not contribute at all, the best option
probably remains to do all the work on one’s own.
In one-shot interactions, the predicted proportion of
cooperative acts is zero for the PD, while the SD results
in a mixed evolutionary stable state with the proportion
of cooperative acts being 1Kc/(2bKc) (Doebeli & Hauert
2005). The assumption of one-shot interactions is,
however, not always realistic because repeated
interactions among the same individuals often occur
with iteration having been shown to favour cooperation in
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Axelrod &
Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Nowak & Sigmund
1992, 1993). When players react on the opponent’s lastThis journal is q 2007 The Royal Society
Table 1. Pay-off matrices of (a) the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
and (b) the Snowdrift game (SD). (In both the games, the
benefit (b) to the opposing player is greater than the cost (c) to
the cooperator. The characteristic pay-off (P ) ranking for the
PD is PDCOPCCOPDDOPCD and PDCOPCCOPCDOPDD
for the SD. The values in brackets indicate the pay-off
matrices that were used for the experiment.)
cooperation (C) defection (D)
(a) Prisoner’s Dilemma
pay-off to C bKc (300) Kc (K100)
pay-off to D b (400) 0 (0)
(b) Snowdrift game
pay-off to C bKc/2 (200) bKc (100)
pay-off to D b (300) 0 (0)
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successful (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). TFT players
cooperate in the first interaction and then play whatever
the opponent played in the previous round. However,
TFT performs poorly if players can make mistakes, as
players may be caught in long series of mutual retaliation.
This problem can be addressed by considering probabil-
istic strategies, which reveals a strategy called generous
TFT (which retaliates only with a probability of 2/3) as
the most successful outcome (Nowak & Sigmund 1992).
Thus, generous TFT players cooperate when both
players cooperated with probability p1Z1, when the
focal individual cooperated and the opponent defected
with p2Z1/3, when the focal individual defected and the
opponent cooperated with p3Z1, and when both
defected with p4Z1/3. When players react not only on
the opponent’s but also on their own previous move, a
new most successful strategy called Pavlov emerged
(Nowak & Sigmund 1993), whereby players apply the
simple rule of win-stay, lose-shift. This strategy consists of
repeating a successful previous move (i.e. a high pay-off
obtained when both players cooperated or when the focal
individual defected and the opponent cooperated) and of
switching to the opposite behaviour if the previous move
was unsuccessful (i.e. a low pay-off obtained when both
players defected or when the focal individual cooperated
and the opponent defected). The Pavlov (win-stay, lose-
shift) strategy is therefore described by p1Z1, p2Z0, p3Z0
and p4Z1. While empirical work indeed showed that
human players successfully apply both TFT-like and
Pavlovian strategies in the IPD (Wedekind & Milinski
1996), it is unknown whether the same strategies are also
used in the iterated Snowdrift game (ISD). Moreover, it is
also unclear whether iteration generally favours co-
operation in the ISD when compared with one-shot
interactions (Doebeli & Hauert 2005).
Despite its potential importance for explaining co-
operation among non-relatives, the SD or the ISD has
received little attention. This is surprising because
similar social dilemmas such as the Hawk–Dove game
(Maynard-Smith 1982) or the Chicken game (Sugden
1986), which have the same pay-off ranking but a different
matrix structure, have been successfully used in beha-
vioural ecology to study cooperation and conflicts in
animals (reviewed by Kun et al. 2006) and in politics,
economy and sociology to study the effects of variousProc. R. Soc. B (2007)factors on human cooperation (Wit & Wilke 1992;
Kollock 1998; Hertel et al. 2000; Mosterd & Rutte
2000; Bornstein & Gilula 2003).
The aim of this study is to compare human cooperative
behaviour in the IPD and the ISD in anonymous repeated
interactions between two players. First, we aimed to test
whether iteration in both the games leads to higher
proportion of cooperative acts when compared with
predicted values in one-shot interactions. Second, we
tested whether cooperation is higher in the ISD than in the
IPD, as it is predicted for one-shot interactions. Third, we
examine whether and in what frequency players apply
TFT-like and Pavlovian strategies in both the IPD and the
ISD. Finally, we tested whether women and men differ in
their cooperative behaviour and whether they apply
different strategies. This is interesting because social
science gender theory predicts sex differences in coopera-
tive behaviour in social situations similar to the SD but not
in situations similar to the PD (Simpson 2003).2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Experimental design
We let 96 students (38 female and 58 male students) of the
University of Lausanne, Switzerland, either play the IPD or
the ISD. The games took place on 3 days within one week in
2006, with the experiments carried out in three different
faculty buildings to ensure that students playing the game on
different days did not know each other. The students were
assigned to groups consisting of six individuals, and, within
groups, students were randomly arranged in pairs, without
knowing the identity and sex of their opponent. This resulted
in 48 pairs of players in 16 groups, with the first group playing
the IPD, the second group playing the ISD and then
alternating.
The pay-off matrices used for the IPD and the ISD are
given in table 1. The pay-offs for PDC, PCC, PDD and PCD (the
four possible outcomes when two players have the choice to
either cooperate (C) or cheat (D)) were chosen such that the
average pay-off across outcomes is the same in both the
games. This is important to allow direct comparison of pay-
offs between the games. Consequently, the values for the
benefit (b) of being the recipient of a cooperative act and the
cost (c) to the cooperator differed between the games (IPD:
bZ400 and cZ100; ISD: bZ300 and cZ200). Importantly,
these differences should not bias the proportion of coopera-
tive acts in the two games because the increased benefit to the
recipient (bIPDKbISDZ100) in the IPD when compared with
the ISD is directly offset by the reduced cost of cooperation
(cIPDKcISDZK100).
The players were separated from one another and had
visual contact only with the game instructors but not with the
other players. There were three game instructors: two who
coordinated the game (coordinators) and one who immedi-
ately recorded all players’ moves and the resulting pay-offs
after each interaction (administrator). The coordinators
distributed the written game instructions containing the
pay-off matrix (table 1a,b) to the players and 800 units of
Monopoly (Parker Brothers) money. For each interaction,
the players indicated whether they cooperated (C) or
defected (D) by holding up a card with the letter ‘C’ or ‘D’
(Wedekind & Milinski 1996; Milinski & Wedekind 1998).
The administrator entered the data immediately into a
previously programmed computer file, where the pay-off of
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interaction, the coordinators distributed the pay-off to the
players in the following standardized procedure: the coordi-
nators went to each player (whether or not an individual
gained or lost money) and put the maximal pay-off in
Monopoly money on the table, and then took back the
amount of money to equal the exact pay-off of each player. At
the end of the game, the players had to fill in a questionnaire
stating their sex and whether they had previously heard about
game theory (which was the case for 29.2% of the students).
Each game between two players lasted 12 interactions,
although the players were told that the end of the game is
randomly determined and might occur after any interaction.
The students were further instructed that players with the
four highest pay-offs among all players of the same game
would receive 40 Swiss francs (CHF), 30 CHF, 20 CHF or 10
CHF, respectively. These latter incentives created compe-
tition at a global scale (i.e. among all individuals playing the
same game; West et al. 2006), such that players were enforced
to pursue a strategy that is best among all players and not just
to beat the opponent (Wedekind & Milinski 1996; Milinski &
Wedekind 1998).
(b) Data analyses
Our unit of analysis was the pair of players (nZ48) playing
either the IPD (nZ24) or the ISD (nZ24), with the
proportion of cooperative acts among player pairs across all
12 interactions being the dependent variable. We first tested
whether previous knowledge about game theory and the date
of experiments had an effect on cooperation and found that
they did not (see §3). We then tested whether the proportion of
cooperative acts among player pairs differed between the two
games (IPD or ISD) and between different sex combinations
within player pairs (two females, two males or a male and a
female). We also compared whether the mean proportion of
cooperative acts in the IPD and the ISD differs from the
expected values for one-shot interactions, which are 0 for the
PD and 0.5 for the SD. Finally, we calculated the proportion of
cooperative acts for each interaction separately and tested
whether there is a significant correlation in the proportion of
cooperative acts with increasing number of interactions.
To discriminate between TFT-like and Pavlovian
strategies, we calculated for each player the p3 value (the
probability of cooperation after oneself defected and the
opponent cooperated). As p3Z1 for any type of TFT and
p3Z0 for Pavlov, the p3 value can be used to discriminate
between the two strategies (Wedekind & Milinski 1996). We
assigned strategies only to players with at least two data points
available to calculate p3, and considered individuals with
p3R2/3 as TFT-like players, individuals with p3%1/3 as
Pavlovian players, whereas all other individuals were classified
as players using an undefined strategy.
We first tested whether the number of players using TFT-
like, Pavlovian or undefined strategies differed within and
between the games. We then examined whether TFT-like and
Pavlovian strategies yielded higher pay-offs than undefined
strategies. Finally, we tested whether female and male players
differ in their use of strategy and in their pay-offs achieved.
Whenever possible, we used appropriate parametric
statistical procedures for data analyses and applied the false
discovery rate control method to adjust the nominal a of 5%
in post hoc multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg
1995). Some variables (the proportion of cooperative acts in a
single interaction and p3 values), however, deviatedProc. R. Soc. B (2007)significantly from normal distributions (Shapiro–Wilk test:
p%0.05). In analyses using these variables, we used non-
parametric randomization tests (Manly 1997) based on 1000
iterations.3. RESULTS
Previous knowledge about game theory did not influence
the proportion of cooperative acts per pair (ANOVA
for IPD: F1,22Z0.30, pZ0.59; for ISD: F2,21Z0.48,
pZ0.62). The proportion of cooperative acts was also
not significantly different between the 3 days on which the
experiment was conducted (ANOVA for IPD:
F2,21Z0.03, pZ0.97; for ISD: F2,21Z1.52, pZ0.24).
The proportion of cooperative acts was higher in the
ISD (0.48G0.02, meanGs.e.) than in the IPD
(0.29G0.03), with this difference being highly significant
(ANOVA: F1,44Z27.80, p!0.00001). The mean level of
cooperation during the 12 interactions was close to the
expected equilibrium value (0.5) for one-shot interactions
in the SD (one-sample t-test: t23ZK1.04, pZ0.31). By
contrast, the level of cooperation was significantly higher
than the expected value for one-shot interactions in the
PD (one-sample t-test: t23Z8.37, p!0.00001).
There was a significant difference in the proportion of
cooperative acts depending on whether two male, two
female or a male and a female student played against each
other (figure 1; ANOVA: F2,44Z3.40, pZ0.042). Separate
analyses revealed that the proportion of cooperative acts
was only different in the IPD (figure 1; ANOVA:
F2,21Z4.64, pZ0.021) but not in the ISD (ANOVA:
F2,21Z0.63, pZ0.54), with the proportion of cooperative
acts being significantly higher in female–female and
female–male pairs than in male–male pairs ( post hoc
pairwise comparisons: both pZ0.012).
There was a significant decrease in the proportion of
cooperative acts across interactions (figure 2) for the IPD
(randomization correlation analysis: pZ0.036) and the
ISD ( pZ0.002). These relationships were, however, no
longer significant when excluding the first interaction
(IPD: pZ0.41; ISD: pZ0.19).
Out of the 96 players, 19 (19.8%) used a TFT-like
strategy, 32 (33.3%) used a Pavlovian strategy, while 45
(46.9%) players had an undefined strategy. Players with
previous knowledge about game theory were not more
likely to apply a TFT-like or a Pavlovian strategy than
completely naive players (for IPD: c1
2Z0.12, pZ0.73; for
ISD: c1
2Z0.52, pZ0.47). A comparison of the probability
values p1, p2, p3 and p4 for TFT-like and Pavlovian
strategies (see figure 3 for pooled data across games)
shows that TFT-like and Pavlovian players differ signi-
ficantly only in their p3 values (randomization ANOVA:
nZ51, pZ0.001) but not in p1, p2 and p4 values
(randomization ANOVA tests, p1: nZ24, pZ0.78;
p2: nZ31, pZ0.61; p4: nZ46, pZ0.43). There was no
significant difference in the frequency at which players
used either a TFT-like or a Pavlovian strategy (c1
2Z2.82,
pZ0.09). There was also no significant difference between
the IPD and the ISD in the frequency of players using
TFT-like (7 versus 12), Pavlovian (15 versus 17) and
undefined (26 versus 19) strategies (c2
2Z2.53, pZ0.28).
In both the games, there were significant differences in
the pay-offs achieved between the different strategies
(ANOVA for IPD: F2,45Z11.42, pZ0.0001; for ISD:
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Figure 2. Fluctuation in the proportion of cooperative acts
across 12 interactions in the IPD (filled circles) and the ISD
(open circles; nZ24 pairs of players in both games).
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Figure 1. The meanGs.e. proportion of cooperative acts in 12
interactions between two females (FF), a female and a male
(FM) or two males (MM) in the IPD and the ISD. Numbers
below the data points represent the sample size (i.e. the
number of player pairs).
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revealed that pay-offs were significantly higher for TFT-
like and Pavlovian than for undefined strategies (TFT-like
versus undefined strategies, IPD: pZ0.007, ISD: pZ0.006;
Pavlovian versus undefined strategies, IPD: pZ0.002, ISD:
pZ0.006), while there was no significant difference in the
pay-offs between TFT-like and Pavlovian strategies (IPD:
pZ0.73, ISD: pZ0.95).
In the IPD, 12 out of 19 (63.2%) female players and 10
out of 29 (34.5%) male players applied either a TFT-like
or a Pavlovian strategy, with female players using these
strategies marginally significantly more often than male
players (c1
2Z3.80, pZ0.051). As a consequence, female
players in the IPD obtained significantly higher pay-offs
(1441G275, meanGs.e.) than male players (783G122;
ANOVA: F1,46Z5.46, pZ0.024). There were no such
significant differences in the ISD, where similar propor-
tions of females (10 out of 19; 52.6%) and males (19 out of
29; 65.5%) used either a TFT-like or a Pavlovian strategy
(c1
2Z0.80, pZ0.37) obtaining almost identical pay-offs
(female players: 1737G116; male players: 1745G65;
ANOVA: F1,46Z0.004, pZ0.95).Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)4. DISCUSSION
Our experiment on human cooperation showed that the
proportion of cooperative acts is significantly higher in the
ISD than in the IPD. As the two social dilemmas represent
two different social situations, our result shows that
humans adjust their cooperative behaviour according to
the social context. Hence, in a social context with a high
risk of being exploited by a defector (IPD), humans have a
low willingness to cooperate, while in a social context with
reduced costs of being defected (ISD) human willingness
to cooperate increases.
While theoretical work consistently showed that
iteration favours cooperation in the IPD, models based
on the ISD game are scarce and revealed mixed results
(reviewed by Doebeli & Hauert 2005). Here, we show that
iteration led to higher mean levels of cooperation, when
compared with one-shot interactions, in the IPD but not
in the ISD. This suggests that iteration in the ISD
maintains cooperation but does not favour it.
Our comparison of the proportion of cooperative acts
over time indicates that iteration leads to reasonably stable
levels of cooperation (figure 2). An exception is only the
first interaction where the proportion of cooperative acts
was considerably higher than in all other interactions.
Because players in our experiment obtained no training, the
overall decrease in cooperation across interactions might be
due to learning and/or strategy effects (Ledyard 1995).
The rewarding scheme and the pay-off matrix compo-
sition are known to have an important effect on the
proportion of cooperative acts (Ledyard 1995). In our
experiment, only players who were best among all players
were rewarded, which creates competition at a global scale
(i.e. among all individuals playing the same game). Such a
rewarding scheme is known to lead to higher proportions
of cooperative acts when compared with situations where
players just need to beat the opponent to get rewarded (i.e.
competition at a local scale; see West et al. 2006). Another
widely used rewarding scheme is when each player gets
monetary rewards according to his/her final pay-off at the
end of the game (Ledyard 1995). It is possible that such a
rewarding scheme would lead to different proportions of
cooperative acts than in our rewarding scheme. Similarly,
other matrix compositions (e.g. higher or lower b and c
values) might also influence the proportion of cooperative
acts. However, if this is the case, the proportion of
cooperative acts should be similarly affected in the IPD
and the ISD such that the observed differences between
the two games should hold under various rewarding
schemes and matrix compositions.
Another interesting result of our study is that female
and male players behaved differentially in the IPD (but not
in the ISD), with cooperative acts between two female
players occurring more than twice as often as between two
male players (figure 1). Women also applied TFT-like or
Pavlovian strategies significantly more often than men and
achieved significantly higher pay-offs than men did. These
data indicate that in a social context with a high risk of
being exploited by a defector (IPD), women choose more
successful and more cooperative strategies than men.
However, males were not unconditional poor cooperators
as they apparently altered their strategy in response to the
more cooperative female strategy by being less cooperative
when playing against males than against females. All these
sex differences in cooperative behaviour were absent in the
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Figure 3. The players’ strategies classified as (a) a TFT-like strategy (grey bars, nZ19; white bars represent expected values for
generous TFT) or (b) a Pavlovian strategy (grey bars, nZ32; white bars represent expected values for Pavlov). The p-values
(meanGs.e.) indicate the probability of cooperation after both players cooperated ( p1), after the focal individual cooperated and
opponent defected ( p2), after the focal individual defected and the opponent cooperated ( p3) and after both players defected
( p4). As there were no significant differences in the p1–4 values between the IPD and the ISD, we present the pooled results across
both the games.
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Figure 4. Comparison of the total pay-off (meanGs.e.) after
12 interactions achieved by players using a TFT-like (white
bars), a Pavlovian (black bars) or an undefined (grey bars)
strategy in the IPD and the ISD. Asterisks indicate significant
differences in the pay-off between two strategies.
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exploited. Whether the different responses of females and
males to different social contexts are the result of selection
remains, however, speculative and needs to be explored in
more detail.
Our results on sex differences in cooperation occurring
in the IPD but not in the ISD contrast with theory of social
sciences, which predicts the opposite pattern. These
predictions are based on the idea that males defect out
of greed (i.e. they defect in the hope that the opponent
cooperates), whereas females defect out of fear (i.e. they
defect because they fear that the opponent defects;
Eagly & Wood 1999; Simpson 2003). Because the PD
allows defection out of greed and fear, no sex differences in
cooperation are expected. In the SD, however, defection
can only occur out of greed, thus predicting females to be
more cooperative than males (Simpson 2003). However,
empirical tests of these hypotheses, which are mostly
based on different variants of the PD (with and without
greed and/or fear), revealed no clear support (reviewed by
Sell et al. 1993; Ledyard 1995; Simpson 2003). These
results combined with our findings suggest that there is no
simple rule on how males and females behave in different
social dilemmas but that, under certain conditions, sex
differences in cooperation do occur.
Our analyses reveal that TFT-like and Pavlovian
strategies are successfully used not only in the IPD but
also in the ISD. The pattern of strategy use was
remarkably similar between the two games with similar
number of players applying TFT-like and Pavlovian
strategies and with both strategies leading to higher pay-
offs than the pay-off of all other strategies (figure 4). This
comparison shows that TFT-like and Pavlovian strategies,
which have been shown to be the most successful
strategies in the IPD (Nowak & Sigmund 1992, 1993),
are equally successful in the ISD.
Although many players played TFT-like and Pavlovian
strategies, there were subtle but consistent differences from
the expected behaviour under the generous TFTand Pavlov
strategies (figure 3). While p2, p3 and p4 values of TFT-like
players were quite well matched with the expected values of
generous TFT, the p1 value (the probability of cooperationProc. R. Soc. B (2007)after both players cooperated) was much lower. A similar
pattern could be observed for Pavlovian players where not
only the observed p1 but also the p4 value was much lower
than the expected values. The strategies found here can be
better than classical generous TFT and Pavlov strategies
because it pays off not to cooperate after both players
cooperated (low p1), when playing against an unconditional
cooperator. Likewise, one gets less exploited when not
automatically switching to cooperation after mutual defec-
tion (low p4), when playing against an unconditional
defector. Our results of lower than expected p1 and p4 values
are in line with the findings of Wedekind & Milinski (1996)
and indicate that both in the IPD and the ISD players use
more sophisticated strategies than the ones expected from
computer simulations (Nowak & Sigmund 1992, 1993).
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that the ISD is
an important model for studying human cooperation,
which can be used complementary to the IPD that has
often been applied in empirical studies (Ledyard 1995;
Wedekind & Milinski 1996; Milinski & Wedekind 1998;
West et al. 2006). Our data show that the ISD can
2970 R. Ku¨mmerli et al. Human cooperation in social dilemmaspotentially explain high levels of cooperation among non-
relatives in humans. Moreover, the ISD might even reflect
the social dilemma more realistically because it corre-
sponds to frequently observed natural situations where
cooperators contribute to a public good that is exploitable
by cheaters but also provides immediate direct benefit to
the cooperator.
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